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[Crim. No. 10346. In Bank. Dec. 23, 1966.] 
THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. PHILLIP 
DEAN ELLIS, Defendant and Appellant. 
[1] .Witnesses-Self-incrimination-Identi1ication of Accused.-
The privilege against self-incrimination applies to evidence of 
the accused's communications or testimony, but not to real or 
physical evidence derived from him. The results of voice identi-
fication tests fall within the category of real or physical evi-
dence. . 
[2] Words and Phrases--"Voice Identi1ication 'l'estn.-In a voice 
identification test, the speaker is not asked to communicate 
[1] See Oal.Jur.2d, Witnesses, § 19; Am.Jur., Witnesses (1st ed 
§ 63). . 
:Hcx. Dig. References: [1] Witnesses, § 23; [2] Words and 
Phrases; [3] Criminal Law, § 565; [4] Witnesses, § 19; [5] Crimi-
nal Law, § 453(7); [6] Privacy, § 2; Witnesses, § 23; [7] Criminal 
Law, § 453(6) j [8, 10] Witnesses, §§ 14, 23; [9] Criminal Law, 
§ 389; Witnesses, § 23; [11] Criminal Law, § 389 (7); Witnesses, 
§ 14; [12] Criminal Law, § 453(7); Witnesses, § 23; [13] Criminal 
Law, § 453; Witnesses, § 23; [14] Criminal Law, § 617; [15] 
Words and Phrases; [16, 17] Criminal Law, § 627; [18] Criminal 
Law, § 1404(14); Rape, §§ 96(3), 96(5). 
-Retired Associate Justice of the Supreme Court sitting under assign-
ment by the Chairman of the Judicial Council. 
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ideas or knowledge of facts, but to engage in the physiological 
processes necessary to produce a series of articulated sounds, 
the verbal meanings of which are unimportant. 
[3] Oriminal Law-Evidence-Identity.-The speech patterns of 
individuals are distinctive physical characteristics that serve to 
identify them just as do other physical characteristics, such as 
color of eyes, hair, and skin, physical build and fingerprints. 
[4] Witnesses - Self-incrimination - Defendants in Criminal 
Proceedings.-The privilege against self-incrimination does not 
prohibit the state from demanding assistance from an indi-
vidual in criminal proceedings taken against him. 
[6] Oriminal Law - Evidence - Silence as Admission - Duty to 
Reply When Under Arrest.-It is no more unfair to ask a 
suspect to speak for voice identification than to ask him to 
appear in a lineup for visual identification. 
[6] Privacy-Extent of Privilege: Witnesses-Self-incrimination-
Identific~tion of Accused.-A voice test for identification 
purposes contemplates no invasion into privacy; no disclosure 
of thought or privately held information is requested. One's 
voice is not of a private nature; it is constantly exposed to 
public observation and is merely another identifying physical 
characteristic. 
[7] Criminal Law-Evidence-Silence as Admission.-It is not 
permissible to penalize an individual for exercising his privi-
lege against self-incrimination under the U.S. Const., 5th 
Amend., when he is under police custodial interrogation. 
[8] Witnesses - Self-incrimination - Oonstitutional Provisions: 
Identification of Accused.-An accused has no constitutional 
right to refuse to speak solely for purposes of voice identifica-
tion, and the rule prohibiting comment on the failure of an 
accused to testify at trial does not apply to the refusal of the 
accused to speak solely for purposes of voice identification. 
[9] Oriminal Law-Evidence-Facts Showing Consciousness of 
Guilt: Witnesses - Self-incrimination - Identification of Ac-
cused.-Defendant's refusal to "display his voice" to permit 
his identification by the victim of an assault with in'tent to 
commit rape was not itself a testimonial communication; the 
refusal was circumstantial evidence of consciousness of guilt. 
The admission of evidence of such refusal does not violate the 
privilege against self-incrimination. 
[10] Witnesses - Self-incrimination - Constitutional Provisions: 
Identification of Accused.-Protection against possible police 
abuse in obtaining evidence is one of the primary reasons for 
the existence of the privilege against self-incrimination under 
the U.S. Const., Fifth Amend. 
[11] Oriminal Law-Evidence-Facts Showing Consciousness of 
Guilt - Conduct on Arrest: Witnesses - Self-incrimination -
" 
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Constitutional Provisions.-Conduct indicatillg cOllsciousncss 
of guilt is not a testimonial statement of guilt and, therefore, is 
not protected by the U.S. Const., 5th Amend. By acting like n 
guilty person, a man does not testify to his guilt, but merely 
exposes himself to the drawing of inferences from circum stall-
tial evidence of his state of mind. 
[12] 1d.-Evidence-Silence as Admission-Duty to Reply When 
,Under Arrest: Witnesses-Self -incrimination-Identification 
of AccUsed.-Where police officers warneddefendallt that he 
had a right to remain silent and that anything he said could be 
used against him, but did not distinguish between speech in 
terms of communications and speech for voice identification, 
defendant's refusal to speak may have resulted directly from 
the police warning and his refusal could not be used against 
him. 
[13] 1d.-Evidence-Silence as Admission-Duty to Reply When 
Under Arrest: Witnesses-Self-incrimination-Identification 
of Accused.-Where the police, after warning defendant that 
. he has a right under the U.S. Const., 5th Amend., to l'emain si-
lent, direct defendant to speak for voice identification and he 
refuses, they must, as a prerequisite to use of his refusal to 
speak as evidence of a consciousness of guilt, advise him that 
the" right to remain silent does not include the right to refuse 
to participate in a voice identification test. 
[14] 1d.-Argument of Counsel-Scope.-Interpretative, but fair, 
comment on evidence submitted to a jury is proper. A prose-
cutor should point out the conflicts and inconsistencies in the 
evidence and evidentiary matters that render the prosecution 
testimony more believable than that submitted by the 
"defense. 
[16] Words and Phrases - "Lia.r": "Perjurer". - The term liar 
implies more than offering untrue testimony; it implies a wilful 
falsehood. The term perjurer has the additional element of an 
oath. 
[16] Criminal Law - Argument of Counsel - Comment on Wit-
nesses.-Unless a prosecutor, in arguing that a witness commit-
ted perjury, is careful to state that his conclusion is predicated 
solely on the evidence before the jury, the spectre of jury 
reliance on prosecutorial access to information outside the 
record is raised. 
[17] 1d. - Argument of Counsel- Comment on Witnesses. - In 
.attacking the credibility of defense witnesses, a single refer-
ence to a witness as having perjured himself, based on an 
analysis of evidence before the jury, may be unobjectionable; 
however, when a prosecutor makes repeated references to 
defendant and his wife as perjurers, notwithstanding objection, 
and further suggests that the issue of perjury bears directly OQ 
the issue of guilt, his argument constitutes misconduct. 
) 
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[18] Id.-Appeal-Reversible Error-Argument of Prosecutor: 
Rape - Assault With Intent to Commit Rape - Appeal-
Reversible Error.-In a prosecution for assault with intent to 
commit rape, where the jury w!1s presented with directly con-
flicting evidence supported by independent witnesses on both 
sides, reversal was required by the reasonable probability that 
a result more favorable to defendant would have been reached 
absent the error in admitting evidence that defendant refused 
to take a voice identification test, and the prosecutor's mis-
conduct in commenting on defendant's refusal and repeatedly 
referring to defendant and his wife as perjurers, with the 
further suggestion that the issue of perjury bore directly on 
the issue of guilt. 
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of San 
Mateo County. Frank W. Rose, Judge. Reversed. 
Prosecution for assault with intent to commit rape. Judg-
ment of conviction reversed.. 
James R. Tormey, Jr., under appointment by the Supreme 
Court, and Michael R. Nave for Defendant and Appellant. 
Thomas C. Lynch, Attorney General, Edward P. O'Brien, 
John F. Kraetzer and John Murphy, Deputy Attorneys Gen-
eral, for Plaintiff and Respondent. 
TRAYNOR, C. J.-Defendant appeals from a judgment of 
conviction entered upon a verdict finding him guilty of assault 
with intent to commit rape (Pen. Code, § 220). 
The victim testified that while she was waiting for a bus in 
Burlingame at 5 a.m., July 20, 1964, defendant sought to 
induce her to engage in sexual intercourse. When she rebuffed 
him, he threatened to use his knife to compel submission. She 
saw no knife, but fled screaming, and defendant ran beside her 
repeatedly whispering, "Walk. Don't run." When a news-
paper boy appeared on the otherwise deserted street defendant 
disappeared. 
Defendant was arrested on September 9, 1964, and taken to 
the San Mateo Police Department, where the victim identified 
him in a lineup as her assailant. The victim also indicated that 
she could identify her assailant's voice. She was placed in a 
[18] See Oal.Jur.2d, Appeal and Error, § 624; Am. Jur., Trial 
(1st ed § 470). 
-) 
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room next to the interrogation room, and defendant was asked 
to repeat phrases recited by the police. Defendant refused to 
cooperate and remained silent. 
Police officers testified that they advised defendant of his 
right to counsel and of his right to remain silent and testified 
to his responses to their questions. They also testified that he 
refused to participate in the voice identification test. Defend-
ant contends that introduction of the evidence of his refusal to 
participate in a voice identification test and the prosecutor's 
comments thereon violated his constitutional privilege against 
self-incrimination. 
[1] The privilege against self-incrimination applies to evi-
dence of "communications or testimony" of the accused, but 
not to "real or physical" evidence derived from him. (E.g., 
Schmerber v. California (1966) 384 U.S. 757, 764 [16 L.Ed.2d 
908, 86 S.Ct. 1826]; Holt v. United States (1910) 218 U.S. 
245, 252-253 [54 L.Ed. 1021, 31 8. Ct. 2] ; Gilbert v. United 
States (9th Cir. 1966) 366 F.2d 923; United Stat-es v. Denno 
(2d Cir.1966) 355 F.2d 731,738; Rigney v. Hendrick (3d Cir. 
1965) 355 F.2d 710, 713-714; Kennedy V. United States (D.C. 
Cir. 1965) 353 F.2d 462, 466; Caldwell V. United States (8th 
Cir. ~964) 338 F.2d 385, 389; People v. Lopez (1963) 60 
Ca1.2d 223, 243-244 [32 Cal.Rptr. 424, 384 P.2d 16] ; People v. 
Duroncelay (1957) 48 Ca1.2d 766, 770 [312 P.2d 690] ; People 
v. Trujillo (1948) 32 Cal.2d 105, 112-113 [194 P.2d 681l; 
People v.' Zavala (1966) 239 Cal.App.2d 732, 738-739 [49 
Cal.Rptr.129] ; 8 Wigmore, Evidence (McNaughton rev. 1961) 
§ 2265, p. 386; Model Code of Evidence (1942) rule 201 (2); 
Uniform Rules of Evidence (1953) rule 23 (3).) The results of 
voice identification tests fall within the category of real or 
physical evidence. (Gilbert V. United States, supra; Rigney v. 
Hendrick, supra; People V. Lopez, supra;1 Wigmore, op. cit., 
supra; cf. People V. Graves (1966) 64 Ca1.2d 208 [49 Cal.Rptr. 
386, 411 P.2d 114], cert. den., 385 U.S. 883 [17 L.Ed.2d 
111, 87 8.0t. 175].) [2] In such a test, the speaker is 
asked, not to communicate ideas or knowledge of facts, but to 
engage in the physiological processes necessary to produce a 
series of articulated sounds, the verbal meanings of which are 
lOther state authority is collected at 16 A.L.R.2d 1322-1828; 2 
A.L.R.2d Later Case Service. See also State V. Freeman (1965) 195 Kan. 
561 [408 P.2d 612]; State v. King (1965) 44 N.J. 346 [209 A.2d 110]; 
Boyer v. State (Fla. App. 1966) 182 So.2d 19. For an analysis of the 
limited stnte authority that excludes voice identification see Recent Cases 
(1949) 24 Ind.L.J. 587. 
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unimportant. The sounds alone are elicited for identification 
purposes through characteristics such as pitch, tone, intona-
tion, accent, and word stress. [3] The speech patterns of 
individuals are distinctive2 physical characteristics that serve 
to identify them just as do other physical characteristics such 
as color of eyes, hair, and skin, physical build and finger-
prints. 
Voice identification testimony is the product of an observa-
blephysical characteristic made by an independent witness. It 
is the very type of objective factual evidence, independent of 
information communicated by the accused, that the privilege 
encourages police to seek.s Moreover, independent iaentifica-
tion testimony, unlike testimonial evidence derived from the 
accused, raises no question of reliance on the veracity of the 
accused. 4o Any attempt by a suspect to disguise his voice is apt 
to be detected readily by those persons present who can 
compare the sample with his normal voice. Furthermore, there 
is no risk that one could be coerced into falsely accusing 
himself. It is difficult to imagine how a suspect could be 
induced to impersonate an unknown voice to incriminate 
himself. 
[4] It has been urged that the privilege reflects an ulti-
mate sense of fairness that prohibits the state from demanding 
assistance" of any kind-from an individual in penal proceedings 
taken against him. IS The privilege includes no such prohibi-
2Even the untutored ear" usually can distinguish a male voice from a 
female voice, a foreign accent from a local accent, a lisp from conven-
- tional speech, or identify a peculiar way of pronouncing certain words. 
It has been reported that voices can be electronically compared by "voice-
prints" and identified with much the same reliability as fingerprints. 
(Newsweek, April 25, 1966; 89 Science News 293 (1966).) 
3Rscobcdo v. Illinois (1964) 378 U.S. 478, 488-489 [12 L.Ed.2d 971, 
94 S.Ct. 1758] ; People v. Graves, supra, 64 Cal.2d 208, 211; 8 Wigmore, 
Evidl!Dce (McNaughton rev. 1961) § 2251. 
4The nrgument has beeu a<lvnnced that the mere act of speaking pro-
<luces an implied testimonial element: an implied statement by the 
nccused that "this is my voice." (Weintraub, Voice Identijicatioft" Writ-
ing Exemplars and the Privilege Agaift,st Sell-Incrimift,atioft, (1957) 10 
Vand.L.Rev. 485, 505.) This contention is logically correct, but it could 
easily include any situation where the subject is required to cooperate 
in making possible inspection of physical chnracteristics (i.e., stance, 
walk, facial features, writing, fingerprints, blood tests). The key issue, 
however, is the degree of reliance on the veracity of the accused. (Ibid.) 
'l'hc difficulty of deceit and the practical impossibility of a knowing 
attempt at a false self-incrimination, through a voice impersonation of 
a guilty party, lead us to reject this fncto!" as not being significant in 
voice identification. (Sec Comment (1948) 1 Vand.L.Rev. 248, 250.) 
ISSee 8 Wigmore, Evidence (McNaughton rev. 1961) § 2251, pp. 317-
318. 
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tion. Criminal proceedings are replete with instances where at 
least passive cooperation of an accused may bc constitutionally 
required.6 
A suspect asked to speak for voice identification is not 
subjected to the same psychological pressures said to be 
generated by a demand for testimony.7 [5] It is no more 
unfair to ask a suspect to speak for voice identification than to 
ask him to appear in a lineup for visual identification. The 
psychological pressures are reduced to the same degree, 
through a limitation of alternatives. Deceit is improbable; the 
simple choice for a guilty person is between conduct likely to 
expose incriminating evidence and inferences as to guilt likely 
to :flow from a successful refusal to participate. 
A related view of the individual interest protected by the 
privilege focuses on the right of privacy. (United States v. 
Grunewald (2d Oir. 1956) 233 F.2d 556, 581-582 (Frank, J., 
dissenting) revd. 353 U.S. 391 [1 L.Ed.2d 931, 77 8.0t. 963, 62 
A.L.R.2d 1344]; Ratner, Oonsequences of Exercising the 
Privilege Against Self-Incrimination (1957) 24 U.Ohi.L.Rev. 
472,488-489.) The Fifth Amendment right of privacy protects 
at least uncommunicated thoughts and has been extended to 
preclude compelled production of private papers and docu-
ments. (Boyd v. United States (1886) 116 U.S. 616 [29 L.Ed. 
746, 6 8.0t. 524].) [6] A voice test, however, contemplates 
no such intrusion into privacy; no disclosure of thought or 
privately held information is requested. One's voice is hardly 
of a private nature. It is constantly exposed to public observa-
tion and is merely another identifying physical characteris-
tic. 
6Examples are set forth at 8 Wigmore. Evidence (McNaughton rev. 
1961) 12265, pp. 387-397. They include :fingerprinting, photographing, 
or measuring of the subject. taking imprints of portions of a suspect's 
body. removal of or placing articles of clothing on the subject, and requir-
ing the accused's presence at the trial itself. 
A controlling distinction sometimes made between active and passive 
cooperation is. in terms of the reasons for the existence of the privilege, 
more apparent than real. II This is a distinction which is aesthetically 
attractive but which seems to have no basis in history, practicality or 
justice." (McCormick. Evidence (1954) § 126, p.265.) Passive coopera-
tion is affirmative cooperation; at least passiveness of the subject is 
required to take a :fingerprint or a photograph. The subject can resist 
having a "fingerprint or photograph taken. There is no greater likelihood 
that coercion would be employed or that a suspect would be disturbed 
physical1y or psychologically in those cases where "active" cooperation 
is requested than where II passive" cooperation is necessary. 
1 A demand for a statement is said to produce a " cruel trilemma." 
{Murphy v. Waterfront Com. (1964) 378 U.S. 52 [12 L.Ed.2d 678, 84 
S.Ct. 1594]; 8 Wigmore. Evidence (McNaughton rev. ]961) § 2251, pp. 
316-317.) 
.) 
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It thus appears that an extension of the privilege to voice 
identification would serve none of the purposes of the privi-
lege. It would only exclude evidence of· considerable impor-
tance when visual identification is doubtful or impossible. The 
masked robber, the telephone extortionist, and the attacker in 
the night may all seek refuge behind an extension of the privi-
lege that would do little to further the welfare of accused 
persons in general. Denial of access to a pertinent identifying 
trait can only weaken a system dedicated to the ascertainment 
of truth. 
We do not leave the individual unprotected. The need for 
protection is greater in confession cases where the risk of 
police overzealousness is comparatively great because self-
incriminating statements are the most persuasive evidence of 
guilt. Testimony by a witness resulting from a purported 
identification is less conclusive and· there is there~ore less 
incentive for police to use unwarranted pressure in obtaining 
the evidence. Nevertheless, it bears emphasis that, as in the 
case of all police procedures for the securing of nonprivileged 
evidence, fundamental principles of fairness and due process 
are always applicable to prevent abuse. (See Rochin v. Cali-
fornia (1952) 342 U.S. 165 [96 L.Ed. 183, 72 S.Ct. 205, 25 
A.L.R.2~ 1396] ; People v. Matteson (1964) 61 Ca1.2d 466 [39 
Cal.Rptr. 1,393 P.2d 161].) 
Even though evidence obtained from a voice identification! is 
not within. the privil~ge against self-incrimination, the ques-
tion remains whether evidence and comment on a refusal to 
take such a test is admissible. [7] It is clear that "it is 
impermissible to penalize an individual for exercising his 
Fifth Amendment privilege when he is under police custodial 
interrogation." (Miranda v. Arizona (1966) 384 U.S. 436, 
468, fn. 37 [16 L.Ed.2d 694, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 10 A.L.R.3d 974].) 
This doctrine is a logical extension (People v. Cockrell (1965) 
63 Ca1.2d 659 [47 Cal.Rptr. 788, 408 P.2d 116]) of the rule of 
Gt'iffin v. California (1965) 380 U.S. 609 [14 L.Ed.2d 106, 85 
8.Ct. 1229], prohibiting comment on the failure of an accused 
to testify at trial. Comment on refusal to testify was held to be 
"a penalty imposed by courts for exercising a constitutional 
privilege. It cuts down on the privilege by making its asser-
tion costly." (Griffin v. California, supra, at p. 614.) 
[8] Such a rule is not applicable when, as in this case, the 
defendant has no constitutional right to refuse to speak solely 
for purposes of voice identification. 
[9] Nor was defendant's refusal to "display his voice" 
} 
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itself a testimonial communication. It was circumstantial evi-
dence of consciousness of guilt, and like similar evidence, such 
as escape from custody (People v. Otis (1959) 174 Cal.App.2d 
119 [344 P.2d 342]), false alibi (People v. Allison (1966) 245 
Cal.App.2d 568, 576 [54 Cal.Rptr. 148]), flight (People v. 
Hoyt (1942) 20 Ca1.2d 306 [125 P.2d 29]), suppression of 
evidence (People v. Burton (1961) 55 Ca1.2d 328 [11 Cal. 
Rptr. 65, 359 P.2d 433]), and failure to respond to accusatory 
statements when not in police custody (see 19 Cal.Jur.2d, Evi-
dence, § 401, p. 141 et seq.), its admission does not violate the 
privilege. Moreover, as in the foregoing examples, the evidence 
did not result from a situation contrived to produce conduct 
indicative of guilt. Unlike the superstitious tests described by 
Wigmore8 and their modern successor, the lie detector,9 that 
have as their sole purpose the establishment of an environment 
in which the accused's consciousness of guilt can be detected, 
the purpose of asking defendant to speak was to obtain proba-
tive physical evidence and the conduct was merely incident to 
that effort. [10] [See fn. 10] A guilty party may prefer not 
to find himself in a situation where consciousness of guilt may 
be inferred from his conduct, but it can scarcely be contended 
that the police, who seek evidence from the test itself, will 
tend to coerce parties into refusing to take tests in order to 
produce this evidence. 10 
[11] Although conduct indicating consciousness of guilt is 
often described as 'an "admission by conduct, "11 such 
nomenclature should not obscure the fact that guilty conduct 
is not a testimonial statement of guilt. It is therefore not 
protected by the Fifth Amendment. By acting like a guilty 
person, a man does not testify to his guilt but merely exposes 
8" 'In the olden time it was a popular superstition that the corpse 
of the slain would bleed afresh if touched by the murderer; and it was 
deemed almost conclusive of guilt that he who was charged with the 
murder refused to lay his finger on the body or to take his hand; • • .' " 
(2 Wigmore, Evidence (3d ed. 1940) § 275.) • 
'The lie detector operates on a principle of observable physiological 
deviations from the norm when an accused attempts to avoid verbal 
responses which he thinks will indicate guilt. It is designed to probe the 
conscious knowledge of the accused and in that respect sought-after re-
aponses may be viewed as essentially testimonial. (Bee Bchmerber v. 
California, supra. 384 U.B. 757, 764.) 
10Protection from possible police abuse in obtaining evidence is of 
course one of the primary reasons for the existence of the Fifth Amend-
ment privilege, but the protection is unnecessary when police efforts in 
conducting voice tests will tend to prevent, not induce, the production of 
evidence of a refusal to cooperate. 
uSee, e.g., McCormick, Evidence, 11247-21)0. 
) 
538 PEOPLE 11. l~LL(s [65 C.2<l 
himself to the drawing of inferences from circumstantial evi-
dence of his state of mind. 12 
We are aware that the United States Supreme Court in 
Schmcrbcr v. California (1966) 384 U.S. 757, 765, fn. 9 [16 
L.Ed.2d 908, 86 S.Ct. 1826], has cautioned that in some cases 
the administration of tests might result in "testimonial 
products" proscribed by the privilege. 'Ve do not believe, 
however, that the inferences flowing from guilty conduct are 
such testimonial products. Rather, the court's concern seemed 
directed to insuring full protection of the testimonial privilege 
from even unintended coercive pressures. In the case of a 
blood test, for example, the court considered the possibility 
that fear induced by the prospect of having the test adminis-
tered might itself provide a coercive device to elicit incrimi-
nating statements.13 Such a compelled testimonial product 
would of course be inadmissible. 
Evidence' of the refusal is not only probative; its admission 
operates to induce suspects to cooperate with law enforcement 
officials. Only the overriding interest in protecting the privi-
lege against compulsory self-incrimination, itself the result of 
a delicate balance, prohibits evidence or comment in the 
refusal to testify cases. But the privilege itself is not at issue 
here. ,\Vithout exception, none of the reasons that support the 
privilege lends support to a rule that would exclude probative 
evidence obtained from an accused's effort to conceal non-
privileged evidence. 
[12] In the present case, however, the police officers 
12Wigmore was careful to distinguish conduct as evidence of beliet 
from admissions. He not only makes the general point that the term 
, 'implied admissions" is somewhat misleading, even when applied to 
witnesses in a civil case (2 Wigmore, Evidence (3d ed. 1940) § 267, 
p. 95), but he stresscs that in criminal cases guilty conduct on the part 
of an accused is evidence in which the "circumstantial nature of the 
inference strongly dominates the testimonial aspect ...• " (2 Wigmore, 
op. cit., supra, at p. 94.) 
The inferential chain here is no different from that which makes any 
event that docs not directly illuminate the circumstances of the crime 
charged a relevant fnct. The trier of fact must reason from, for example, 
an escape from jail, to a consciousness of guilt that would motivate the 
escapee's conduct, and, from that premise, to the conclusion that such 
conduct is relevant to the ultimate issue of guilt or innocence. The key 
factor is that no testimony of an nccused, or other equivalent intended to 
communicate knowledge, such as n writing, sign langunge, or a demon-
stration, forms the basis for the inferential chain. 
13" Indeed, there may be circumstances in which the pnin, danger, or 
severity of nn operation would almost inevitnbly cause a person to prefer 
confession to undergoing the search, and nothing we say today should be 
taken as estnblishing the permissibility of compulsion in that case." 
(Schmerber v. California, 8upra, 384 U.S. 757, 765, fn. 9.) 
I . 
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warned defendant that he llad the right to remain silent anu 
that anything he said could be used against him. This warning 
did not distinguish between speech in terms of communica-
tions and speech for voice identification, between a refusal to 
speak free from sanctions and a refusal to speak productive of 
detrimental inferences. That distinction would hardly occur to 
a layman unless it was called to his attention. Thus, defenu-
ant's refusal to speak might well have been the direct result of 
the police warning and cannot be used against him. (Cf. John-
son v. United States (1943) 318 U.S. 189 [87 L.Ed. 704, 63 
8.Ct. 549] ; People v. Gilbert (1944) 25 Ca1.2d 422, 443 [154 
P.2d 657].) 
[13] The usual Fifth Amendment warning that a suspect 
has a right to remain silent creates this problem, for if taken 
literally it includes the right not to speak at all.14 After 
having given such a warning, if the police direct a defendant 
to speak for voice identification and he refuses, they must, as a 
prerequisite to the use of the defendant's refusal to speak as 
evidence of consciousness of guilt, advise him that the right to 
remain silent does not include the right to refuse to partici-
pate in such a test. 
Defendant also assigns as error the prosecutor's repeated 
references to him and his alibi witness as perjurers. [14] In-
terpretive, but fair, comment on evidence submitted to the 
jury is proper. The prosecutor should point out the conflicts 
and inconsistencies in the evidence and those evidentiary 
matters that render the prosecution testimony more believable 
than that submitted by the defense. 
Prosecutors tread on dangerous ground, however, when they 
resort to epithets to drive home the falsity of defense evidence. 
(See People v. Love (1961) 56 Cal.2d 720,731 [16 Cal.Rptr. 
777, 17 Cal.Rptr. 481, 366 P.2d 33, 809].) [15] The term 
.liar,lli for instance, implies more than offering untrue testi-
mony; it implies a wilful falsehood. (Webster's New Internat. 
HEven if the warning is understood in this literal sense. however. it 
is not misleading if the evidence sought is not speech for voice identifica· 
tion but evidence of other physical characteristics such as photographs. 
fingerprints, or blood samples. 
uiThe appellate court has characterized use of the term liar as 
"harsh." but "in the realm of fair comment." (People v. Mora (1956) 
139 Cal.App.2d 266. 272-273 [293 P.2d 522].) In that case conflicting 
stories of witnesses were before the jury and no objection to the use of 
the term was made at the trial. (Cf. People v. Baker (1960) 183 Cal. 
App.2d 615, 624-625 [7 Cal.Rptr. 22].) 
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Dict. (2d ed. 1939).) 'rhe term perjurer has, as its only formal 
semantic distinction vis-a.-vis liar, the additional element of 
the oath. (Webster's New Internat. Dict. (2d ed. 1939); see 
Pen. Code, § 118.) A charge of perjury, however, produces 
more than moral opprobrium. Perjury is a felony, and the 
connotation. conveyed to the jury is therefore apt to be far 
more derogatory than that conveyed by the term liar. Particu-
larly when applied to the defendant, it is apt adversely and 
unnecessarily to affect the ability of the jury dispassionately 
to weigh the credibility of the accused and the issue of guilt or 
innocence. [16] Unless the prosecutor is careful to state ___ "" 
that his conclusion that perjury was committed is predicated 
solely on the evidence before the jury, the spectre of jury 
reliance on prosecutorial access to information outside the 
record is raised. (See People v. Perez (1962) 58 Ca1.2d 229, 
246 [23 Cal.Rptr. 569, 373 P.2d 617].) 
[17] . In attacking the credibility of defense witnesses, a 
single reference to a witness as having perjured himself, based 
on an analysis of the evidence before the jury, may be 
unobjectionable. (Cf. People v. Muir (1966) 244 Cal.App.2d 
598, 601-602 [53 Cal.Rptr. 398].) When, however, as in 
this case, the prosecutor makes repeated references to defend-
ant and his wife as perjurers,18 notwithstanding objection, 
and further makes a suggestion that the issue of perjury bears 
16Prosecutor: "I had to bring them all back, every single instance 
where he was pinned down, it turned out he was talking a lie, I-i-e, lie, 
and that went throughout this entire trial. This trial baa been loaded 
with perjury and lies, not one single witness for the People was shaken on 
cross-examination. ' , " 
Defense Counsel: "Your Honor, I am going to object to that alleg~' 
tion as to perjury. . . ." 
Prosecutor: "I didn't say 'perjury.' I said lies-" 
Defense Counsel: "He said perjury." 
The Court: "Your' statement was that your case was loaded down with 
perjury, counsel." 
Prosecutor: "Oh, well, with lies. And it was, wasn't itt Did you ever 
hear such a mob as testified in this case for the defense'" (Rep. Tr .• 
vol. 3, pp. 27, 28.) 
Prosecutor: "[B]eeause of her [defendant's wife] afrection for this 
defendant, for the want of stronger terms, she got on the stand and she 
actually perjured herself. She swore on an oath before God, so help me 
God, I will tell the truth .... " (Rep. Tr., vol. 3, p. 31.) 
Prosecutor: "He has the receipt from Sacramento dated September 
5th, that was the very foundation of two crimes of perjury right here in 
this courtroom. Him and his wife." (Rep. Tr., vol. 3, p. 32.) 
Prosecutor: "[H]e [defendant] put his poor wife on the stand and 
made a perjurer out of her •... " (Rep. Tr., vol. 3, p. 34:.) 
Prosecutor: "[I]f you accept the word of an acknowledged perjurer 
and the word of an acknowledged perjurer'8 wife. • • ." (Rep. Tr., 
vol. 3, p. 61.) 
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directly on the issue of guilt,17 his argument constitutes 
misconduct. (Cf. People v. Oonover (1966) 243 Cal.App.2d 
38 [52 Cal.Rptr. 172]; People v. Reese (1963) 220 Cal.App. 
2d 143 [33 Cal.Rptr. 561].) 
[18] The question remains whether the errors were preju-
dicial. The evidence presents clearly conflicting stories regard-
ing the crime charged. The victim's identification of defend-
ant was supported by the newsboy, who was unable to identify 
defendant, but who testified that defendant's car was" similar 
to the one" he had seen the assailant drive. Defendant and 
his wife testified that they remained at a bowling alley in 
Richmond until 4 :30 on the morning of the assault, at which 
time they drove back to Redwood City by way of San Jose. 
Two independent witnesses, the bowling alley proprietor and 
his wife, testified to the presence of defendant and his wife at 
the bowling alley and to their departure at an hour that would 
have precluded the possibility of defendant's presence at the 
scene of the crime .. 
Defendant was identified by three women who testified to 
five incidents ranging from indecent exposure to use of 
obscene language in a solicitation to sexual intercourse. None 
of these incidents involved violence. The first woman'sidenti-
fication was based on a single midnight encounter that had 
occurred two years earlier. Defendant denied the incident. The 
second woman testified to being followed in the early morning 
hours by a man in a car who ran towards her when she parked 
her car and began walking toward her house. Defendant testi-
fied that he was lost that night, was merely attempting to 
orient himself, and had no evil intent. 
The third woman identified defendant and testified to three 
incidents that occurred after the crime charged and were 
spaced about two weeks apart. Defendant denied two of the 
incidents. As to the third incident, which occurred on Septem-
ber 6, 1964, defendant offered an alibi. He testified that both 
he and his wife were in Sacramento at a bowling tournament 
on that morning. Defendant's wife and his mother corrobo-
rated this alibi. Two disinterested rebuttal witnesses, however, 
testified that they accompanied defendant to Sacramento and 
participated in the bowling tournament, that defendant's wife 
did not make the trip, and that defendant drove back from 
Sacramento in time to leave the witnesses at a point near the 
scene of the incident more than an hour before it occurred. 
17" [YJou can do nothing else but find a perjurer guilty of the charge." 
(Rep. Tr., vol. 3, p. 35.) 
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The jury was presented with directly conflicting evidence 
supported by independent witnesses on both sides. The evi-
dence of consciousness of guilt improperly interjected a factor 
particularly damaging in a case where the defense is an alibi. 
The improper argument made the crucial task of objectively 
weighing the conflicting evidence susceptible to a subjective 
rejection of the defense evidence. \Ve find, therefore, that it is 
reasonably probable that a result more favorable to defendant 
would have been reached absent the errors. (People v. Watso'll 
(1956) 46 Ca1.2d 818, 836 [299 P.2d 243].) 
The judgment is reversed. 
Peters, J., Tobriner, J., Burke, J., and Peek, J.,. concurred. 
MOSK, J.-I dissent. 
The majority opinion easily persuades me that "voice identi.-----
fication is· not within the privilege against self-incrimina. 
tion," and that the rule of Griffin v. Oalifornia (1965) 380 
U.S. 609 [14 L.Ed.2d 106, 85 S.Ct. 1229], is inapplicable when 
the defendant has no constitutional right to refuse to speak 
solely for purposes of voice identification. . 
Our problem ends with the foregoing determination. The 
adoption of yet another rule for police procedure adds a super-
fluous burden to what the majority has appropriately called 
, 'a system dedicated to ascertainment of truth. ' , 
A defendant warned that he has a right to remain silent 
understands he cannot be compelled to give a statement relat-
ing to the offense he is suspected of committing. But certainly 
he cannot reasonably infer from the mandatory admonition 
that he may remain mute thereafter for all purposes. He is 
required to respond when asked his name, address, place of 
employment, next of kin, name of his attorney, and other rele-
vant biographical information. When he goes to court, he may 
be asked similar questions, and generally he is expected to 
personally announce his plea (Pen. Code, § 1018). Queries of 
that type and the vocal response are designed not to effectuate 
self-incrimination but to achieve an orderly administration of 
justice. 
Of a more substantive nature are other permissible efforts of 
the state to obtain the facts necessary for ascertainment of the 
truth, through fingerprinting, photographing, measuring the 
suspect; imprinting a portion of the suspect's body; physical 
*Retired Associate Justice of the Supreme Court sitting under assign-
ment by the Chairman of the Judicial Coullcil. 
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examination of the body; removal of or placing articles of 
clothing on the suspect; requiring the suspect to stand, assume 
a stance, walk, make a particular gesture, to write for identifi-
cation; requiring the suspect to appear in a lineup and ill 
court; or listening to his 'Voice. (8 Wigmore, Evidence 
(McNaughton rev. 1961) pp. 387-399.} Nothing in Griffin ~ug­
gests the impropriety of commenting on defendant's refusal to 
render at least passive cooperation with the foregoing proce-
dures. Indeed, Griffin is limited to prohibiting "comment on 
the refusal to testify ... [because it] is a penalty imposed by 
courts for exercising a constitutional privilege. " (P. 614.) 
I harbor serious doubts as to the ability of peace officers to 
devise a comprehensible warning, as required by the majority, 
that will "distinguish between speecll in terms of communica-
tion and speech for voice identification, between a refusal to 
speak free from sanctions and a refusal to speak productive of 
detrimental inferences." If this is too subtle a distinction for 
laymen, it is equally so for those in the field of law enforce-
ment. 
Since we found no self-incrimination problem involved here 
and Griffin is inapplicable, I perceive no bar to affirming the 
judgment and I would do so. 
McComb, J., concurred. 
